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In Memoriam
Judge Melvin T. Brunetti:
Bringing Life to a Democratic Rule of Law
CHRISTOPHER

D.

SULLIVAN,* EUGENE S. LITvINoFF,**
AND MARK J. SEIFERT***

Judge Melvin T. Brunetti was a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuitand a prominent alumnus of Hastings College of the Law. In this Article, three of
Judge Brunetti'sformer law clerks discuss his exemplary life and careeras a jurist.
The Article opens with a discussion of Judge Brunetti's life experiences and how those
experiences influenced his judicial views. The Article then presents a survey of Judge
Brunetti's judicial record. The survey of Judge Brunetti's work on the bench
commences with his early years as a judge and discusses a number of his higherprofile
decisions. The Article next discusses Judge Brunetti's work during the z990s, including
important cases concerning the First Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, and other
issues. This section of the Article also discusses the extraordinaryand dramatic judicial
proceedings that took place immediately prior to the execution of Robert Alton Harris
in 1992. Harris was the first prisoner in California to be executed in more than 25
years. The Article also discusses Judge Brunetti's work during the years that he enjoyed
senior status. This discussion addresses cases involving several constitutional,criminal
and civil issues, such as § 1983 jurisprudence, First Amendment issues, sentencing
issues, and intellectualproperty issues.
The Article concludes with commentary on Judge Brunetti's disciplined and principled
application of law to facts during the course of his career.Judge Brunetti has bestowed
upon us a legacy of cases that reflect the principle that a strong and independent federal
judiciary and the rule of law are critical components of our democracy.

* Christopher D. Sullivan is a partner at McGrane Greenfield LLP, where he specializes in
complex litigation and is the Immediate Past President of the Northern District of California Chapter
of the Federal Bar Association. Mr. Sullivan clerked for Judge Brunetti during the 1991 1992 term.
** Eugene S. Litvinoff is a partner at McDermott Will & Emery LLP, where he focuses on
antitrust matters, internal investigations, and white collar defense. Mr. Litvinoff clerked for Judge
Brunetti during the 2000-2001 term.

*** Mark J. Seifert is senior counsel with Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP,
where he practices business litigation. Mr. Seifert was a law clerk for Judge Brunetti during the 20022003 term.
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INTRODUCTION

The life and career of Judge Melvin T. Brunetti' stands as a
remarkable testament to the promise that people of great character,
integrity, and good humor can carry forward the mantle of a democratic
rule of law. Judge Brunetti served for twenty-four years on the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and his many written
opinions are a firm part of the fabric of the court's precedents.2 But for
those who have had the good fortune of knowing Judge Brunetti, it is his
personal legacy that stands out. Judge Brunetti demonstrated that the
process of getting to the result is at least as important as the outcome,
and that legal decisions are best made by consistently following the
principles that a judge believes in to reach a fair result. Judge Brunetti
stands among the most prominent and respected alumni of University of
California, Hastings College of the Law.
In this Article, we will explore first how Judge Brunetti's unique
background and life experience exemplify the American democratic
ideal that hard work, talent, and perseverance can lead to great
opportunities. Next we will review a selection of notable opinions written
by Judge Brunetti and important cases in which he participated. These
case reviews demonstrate how Judge Brunetti followed his belief that
"there is no substitute for excellence in the practice of law."3 Judge

Brunetti's judicial record shows a firm commitment to following his

i. Judge Melvin T. Brunetti passed away after a long battle with cancer on October 30, 2oo9, at

his home in Reno, Nevada. News Release, United States Courts for the Ninth Circuit, Court of
Appeals Mourns Loss of Senior Circuit Judge Melvin T. Brunetti (Nov. 2, 2oo9), available at
http://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/cm/articlefiles/124-2ooo9BrunettiObit.pdf. He was still serving as a
Senior Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Id.
2. See id.
3. Robert J. Johnston, In Mernoriarn:Hon. Melvin T Brunetui, NEv. LAW., Jan. 2010, at 50, 50.
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principles and objectively applying the law in the best tradition of the
federal judiciary.

I. THE PATH TO

THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Judge Brunetti was born on November 1o, 1933, in Reno, Nevada.4
His grandparents had immigrated from Italy.' Judge Brunetti's paternal
grandfather left Italy in search of opportunity and work in America.' His
grandfather arrived at Ellis Island and worked his way west to Reno
where he started a grocery business.' Judge Brunetti grew up in a closeknit family in Reno and Sparks, Nevada. His father operated a grocery
store and then established a farm and ranch operation in rural Sparks. 9
When he started kindergarten he did not speak English.'0 Years later,
when voting to strike down an English-only law in Arizona, the judge
"explained in conference that his grandfather in Nevada would not have
been able to obtain any services from the government in any other way.
His grandfather spoke only Italian.""
At the urging of his mother, Judge Brunetti "started playing the
clarinet in the fourth grade" and developed a life-long love of music." By
high school he had started a band that became known as "Brunetti's
Band."' Judge Brunetti later would often entertain his law clerks with
stories of his days in Brunetti's Band and even organized a reunion of the
band later in his life.14
Judge Brunetti graduated from Sparks High School and began his
undergraduate education at the University of Nevada, Reno, studying

4. Federal Judicial Center, Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, Melvin T. Brunetti, http://
www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=294&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited June 24, 20o).
5. Johnston, supra note 3.
6. Lana Chiarello & Rebecca Poate, Judicial Profile: Hon. Melvin T. Brunetti, FED. LAW., Nov.Dec. 2005, at 16, 16.

Id.
See id.
Id.
Johnston, supra note 3.
ii. As relayed by Judge Stephen Reinhardt in an obituary, Dan Levine, Melvin Brunetti, 75, Was
Senior Ninth Circuit Judge, RECORDER, Nov. 3, 2oo9, at 2; see also Dhyana Levy, Conservative Judge
Exercised a PracticalApproach, DAILY J., Nov. 3, 2009, at 8. The case referenced was Yniguez v.
Arizonans for Official English, which was decided by a six-to-five vote. 69 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 1995)
(en banc). Though the en banc decision was vacated by the United States Supreme Court because
Yniguez lacked standing, Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997), the Arizona
Supreme Court also subsequently struck down the law as unconstitutional, writing "we agree with the
result and with much of the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit opinion." Ruiz v. Hull, 957 P.2d 984, 987 n.i
(Ariz. 1998).
12. Johnston, supra note 3; see also Chiarello & Poate, supra note 6, at 16-17; News Release.
United States Court for the Ninth Circuit, supra note i.
13. Chiarello & Poate, supra note 6, at 17.
14. See id. at 19.
7.
8.
9.
io.
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electrical engineering. Encouraged by his life-long good friend, Judge
Procter Hug, Jr., Judge Brunetti was elected the junior class president."
In 1953, Judge Brunetti left the University of Nevada early to enter the
dairy business." Judge Brunetti became the operation manager for a new
dairy that produced, processed, and distributed milk products to all of
Nevada and part of California.'" Judge Brunetti's experience in business
gave him a unique practical insight to approaching legal issues." During
the years 1954-56, Judge Brunetti also served in the Army National
Guard.20 After seven years in the dairy business, Judge Brunetti returned
to the University of Nevada, Reno to pursue a major in accounting.2
Judge Brunetti then decided to pursue a career in law and enrolled
at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law.22 Judge
Brunetti was proud of the fact that he was a member of the last class of
the four-year program at Hastings. "He worked his way through law
school in the tax department of Arthur Young & Company"M until he
graduated in 1964. Judge Brunetti then began practicing law as a
litigator, working as an associate at Vargas, Bartlett and Dixon until
1969.26

During this time, Judge Brunetti married his wife, Gail, with whom
he would enjoy forty-four years of marriage.27 Judge Brunetti was a
devoted family man and would raise three children and many well-loved
dogs.2' After working at Vargas, Judge Brunetti joined the firm of Laxalt,
Bell, Berry, Allison and LeBaron, becoming a partner in 1971-.2 He was
also a shareholder in the firm of Allison, Brunetti, MacKenzie, Hartman,
Soumbeniotis and Russell from 1978 until his appointment to the federal
bench.30

15. Id. at 17; News Release, United States Court for the Ninth Circuit, supra note i.
16. See Chiarello & Poate, supra note 6, at 17; Johnston, supra note 3.
17. See supra note 16.

18. Chiarello & Poate, supra note 6, at 17.
19. For example, as reported by the Los Angeles Times, "Circuit Judge Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain,
a fellow Reagan appointee, credited Brunetti's business and accounting experience for his 'knack in
questioning counsel in a way that brought out fascinating aspects of a case.'" Carol J. Williams, Melvin
Brunetti, 1933-2009, FederalAppellate Judgefor 24 Years, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 3, 2009, at A19.
20. See Federal Judicial Center, Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, supra note 4.
21. Johnston, supra note 3.
22. Id.
23. See Chiarello & Poate, supra note 6, at 17.
24. Id.

25. News Release, United States Court for the Ninth Circuit, supra note i.
26. Id.
27. Id.

28. See Chiarello & Poate, supra note 6, at 37, 19.
29. See News Release, United States Court for the Ninth Circuit, supra note i.
30.

Id.
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Judge Brunetti was active with the Nevada State Bar and served as
president from 1984 to 1985.3' Judge Brunetti became involved in politics
and was a member of the Council of Legal Advisors to the Republican
National Committee from 1982 to

1985."

Judge Brunetti was first

nominated to the Ninth Circuit by President Ronald Reagan on October
5, 1984,33 but his nomination was not considered before Congress
adjourned sine die on October 12 in anticipation of the upcoming
presidential election.34 Judge Brunetti would recall this circumstance with
humor later, and it typifies how Judge Brunetti often had to work twice
as hard for everything he achieved. President Reagan nominated Judge
Brunetti again on February 26, 1985, and he was confirmed by the Senate
on April 3, 1985
II.
A.

JUDGE BRUNETTI'S JUDICIAL RECORD

THE BEGINNING YEARS: 1985-1990

It would not take long for Judge Brunetti to jump into the center of
many of the most difficult cases decided by the Ninth Circuit. In
Adamson v. Ricketts, an en banc decision first argued within six months
of his appointment, Judge Brunetti would write a forceful dissent from
the majority's decision reversing a murder conviction on double jeopardy
grounds.36 The majority found that the defendant's retrial for first degree
murder, after he had breached a plea agreement that resulted in his
conviction for second degree murder, violated his double jeopardy
rights." In his dissent, Judge Brunetti contended that it was the
respondent's refusal to testify that triggered the second prosecution and
that "the [D]ouble [J]eopardy [C]lause 'does not relieve a defendant
from the consequences of his voluntary choice.'"' Judge Brunetti's
position was vindicated by the United States Supreme Court. It reversed
the Ninth Circuit, holding that, although "[t]he parties could have struck
a different bargain, . . . permitting the State to enforce the agreement the
parties actually made does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause."39

31. Id.

32. Media Release, United States Courts for the Ninth Circuit, Ninth Circuit Judge Melvin
Brunetti of Reno, Nevada To Assume Senior Status (Oct. 27, 1999), available at http://2o7.41.9.i5/web/
OCELibra.nsfl5o4ca249c786e2of85256284oo6da7ab/a8f4f3652751a42b88256817oo739dfe?OpenDocument.
33. Reagan Nominates 5 To Fill Judgeships in Federal Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1984, at 58.
34.

See

DENIS STEVEN RuTrKUS & KEVIN M. Scorr, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., NOMINATION AND

CONFIRMATION OF LOWER FEDERAL COURT JUDGES IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION YEARS, CRS-19

(Aug. 13,
2oo8), available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34615.pdf.
35. News Release, United States Courts for the Ninth Circuit, supra note I.
36. 789 F.2d 722, 735 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc), rev'd, 483 U.S. I (1987).
37. Id. at 725-27.
38. Id. at 740 (Brunetti, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 99 (I978)).
39. Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. i, 12 (1987).
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In his early tenure on the bench, Judge Brunetti also faced a
particularly difficult decision regarding the scope of the jurisdiction of a
Native American tribal court: "whether an Indian may be subject to the
criminal jurisdiction of the court of a tribe of which neither he nor his
victim was a member."40 The case was argued on October 8, 1985, first
decided by the Ninth Circuit panel on July 9, 1987,41 and ultimately
overturned by the Supreme Court on August 15,

1990.2

The decision was

one of first impression.4 3 Judge Brunetti framed the issue as
"concern[ing] one of the uncharted reaches of tribal jurisdiction and
present[ing] a troubling choice between recognizing new restrictions on
tribal sovereignty on the one hand, and placing an additional
jurisdictional liability upon Indians not members of the tribe whose
jurisdiction is in question."" Judge Brunetti came down in favor of
honoring tribal rights:
The cases discussing the federal criminal statutory scheme clearly
indicate that if Congress had intended to divest tribal courts of criminal
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians they would have done so. Absent
such divestment it is reasonable to conclude that tribal courts retain
jurisdiction over crimes committed by Indians against other Indians
without regard to tribal membership. 45
The Supreme Court reversed, holding, "[i]n the area of criminal
enforcement, .a., tribal power does not extend beyond internal relations
among members."46 Notably, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall,
dissented, because he did "not share such a parsimonious view of the
sovereignty retained by Indian tribes." This time Judge Brunetti was
vindicated by the United States Congress:
On November 5, 1990, amendments to the Indian Civil Rights Act

(ICRA) became effective which overruled the Supreme Court decision
in

Duro.

. . .A

House

Conference

Report

explains

that

the

amendments "recognize and affirm the inherent power of tribes to
exercise criminal misdemeanor jurisdiction over all Indians on their
respective reservations" and that the amendments were consistent with
"two hundred years of Federal law."48

40. Duro v. Reina, 851 F.2d 1136, 1138 (9th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 495 U.S. 676,684(1990).

41. Id. at 1136.
Duro, 495 U.S. at 676.
Duro, 851 F.2d at 1139.
Id.
Id. at 1143.
Duro, 495 U.S. at 688.
Id. at 698 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Mousseaux v. U.S. Comm'r of Indian Affairs, 8o6 F. Supp. 1433, '44' (D.S.
1992) (quoting
H.R. REP. NO. IOI-938, at 132-33 (1990)) (internal citations omitted). The emergency legislation was
initially temporary, but was "replaced with identical permanent legislation on October 28, 1991." Id. at
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

1440.
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Judge Brunetti also found himself at the forefront of brewing battles
over the sentencing of criminal defendants. In a case decided at the very
end of his first year, United States v. Hall, Judge Brunetti authored an
opinion upholding a sentencing decision.49 He noted that "[i]t has long
been the rule that the matter of sentencing is within the discretion of the
sentencing judge and generally is not reversible as long as the sentence
falls within the bounds set by statute." 0 But the traditional discretion
given to sentencing judges in federal courts was about to dramatically
change. On November i, 1987, the United States Sentencing Guidelines
became effective." The Sentencing Guidelines were the product of the
United States Sentencing Commission, appointed by President Reagan
after he signed into law the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984." Judge
Brunetti was on the panel of Ninth Circuit judges that considered one of
the first constitutional challenges to them. In a two-to-one decision, Judge
Brunetti joined in Judge Kozinski's opinion striking down the Sentencing
Guidelines as an unconstitutional intrusion on the role of the federal
judiciary in violation of the separation of powers doctrine. It is not
surprising that Judge Brunetti would agree with Judge Kozinski's
observation, "Because judges must act-and be perceived to act-with
complete impartiality in carrying out their responsibilities, the
Constitution creates a wall of separation between the judiciary and the
other branches; that wall is only seldom breached."5 4 The Ninth Circuit's
ruling was struck down quickly by the Supreme Court's decision in
Mistretta v. United States."

The end of Judge Brunetti's first five years on the bench would be
marked by the start of a series of appeals arising from the murder
conviction of Robert Alton Harris. In Harris v. Pulley, 6 the Ninth Circuit
considered a number of constitutional issues that were left unresolved by
two federal habeas corpus petitions." The panel unanimously rejected
seven contentions that Harris's constitutional rights had been violated in

49. 778 F.2d 1427, 1428 (9th Cir. 1985).

50. Id.
51. See Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, 857 F.2d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated sub nom.
United States v. Chavez-Sanchez, 488 U.S. 1036 (1989).
52. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §H3551-3742 and 28 U.S.C. §i991-998 (2oo6)); Gubiensio-Ortiz, 857 F.2d at 1246-48.
53. Gubiensio-Ortiz, 857 F.2d at 1266.
54. Id. at 1261.
55. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).

56. 885 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1989).
57. The Ninth Circuit originally vacated the district court's decision to deny habeas corpus relief,
Harris v. Pulley, 692 F.2d 1198, 1192 (9th Cir. 1982), but was subsequently reversed by the Supreme
Court. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 5i (1984) (concluding that California's capital sentencing
system is constitutional without a comparative proportionality review). The case returned to the Ninth
Circuit after the district court again denied habeas corpus relief. Harris, 885 F.2d at 1359.

151o0
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connection with his conviction and sentencing." A majority of the Ninth
Circuit rejected a call to hear the case en banc" and the Supreme Court
denied review.
Harris filed a third habeas petition in March, 1990, which the district
6,
court denied.6 Oral argument on the appeal was held before the same
Ninth Circuit panel on May 14, 1990, and the district court was initially
affirmed in an opinion filed on August 29, 1990." The opinion, though,
was subsequently amended several times to account for new
developments in the case.63 The amended opinion denied Harris the
relief sought in his habeas petition.64 The majority's most important
holdings were that Harris had raised issues late, constituting an abuse of
the writ under McLesky v. Zant;65 that Harris was not denied effective
access to psychiatric expertise under Ake v. Oklahoma;66 and that Harris
was trying to apply a new rule of law that could not be retroactively
applied under Teague v. Lane.67 By the time the amended opinion was
issued, there was substantial disagreement within the Ninth Circuit on
the issues raised. Though the Ninth Circuit did not grant en banc review
of the panel's decision, Judge Reinhardt both dissented from the decision
not to grant review and broadly hinted that the vote on en banc review
was a tie.68 The Supreme Court again denied review. Robert Alton
Harris was on track to be the first person in more than twenty-five years
to be executed in California. 0
Judge Brunetti was also at the center of a controversial decision in
High Tech Gays v. Defense IndustrialSecurity Clearance Office." Writing

for a unanimous court, Judge Brunetti concluded that the Department of
Defense's policy of refusing to grant security clearances to known or
suspected gay applicants should survive a constitutional attack.72 In large
part, the panel relied on the then-recent Supreme Court opinion in

58. Harris, 885 F.2d at 1359.
59. Id. at 1383.
6o. Harris v. Pulley, 493 U.S. 1051 (99)
61. Harris v. Vasquez, 913 F.2d 6o6, 608-09 (9th Cir. 1990).
62. Id.at 6o6.
63. Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1497 (9th Cir. 1991).
64. Id. at 1529.

65. Id. at 1511-16 (citing McLesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991)).
66. Id. at 1516-18 (citing Ake v. Oklahoma, 47o U.S. 68 (1985)).
67. Id. at 1522 (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)).

68. See id. at 1540 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). It was reported in both the New York Times and the
Los Angeles Times that the vote was a thirteen-to-thirteen tie. See Charles M. Sevilla & Michael
Laurence, The Robert Alton Harris Execution: Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents: The
Death Penalty Case of Robert Alton Harris, 40 UCLA L. REV- 345, 366 n.67 (1992).
69. Harris v. Vasquez, 503 U.S. 910 (1992).
70. Sevilla & Laurence, supra note 68, at 348.
71. 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990).
72. Id.at 579.
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Bowers v. Hardwick,73 which held "that homosexual activity is not a
fundamental right protected by substantive due process and that the
proper standard of review under the Fifth Amendment is rational basis
review."" The opinion acknowledged that homosexuals suffered a
history of discrimination, but the panel also noted "legislatures have
addressed and continue to address the discrimination suffered by
homosexuals on account of their sexual orientation through the passage
of anti-discrimination legislation. Thus, homosexuals are not without
political power; they have the ability to and do 'attract the attention of
the lawmakers,' as evidenced by such legislation." 6 This decision
reflected Judge Brunetti's reluctance to use courts as a substitute for
prompting change through political or legislative efforts.
B.

THE MIDDLE YEARS: 1991-1999

i.

Overview

In 1991, Judge Brunetti authored Gaudiya Vaishnava Society v. City
& County of San Francisco." This was an important First Amendment
case upholding the free speech rights of nonprofit organizations seeking
to raise money in connection with other activities. The appeal arose from
a challenge to "the constitutionality of an ordinance which regulates the
sale of merchandise on public sidewalks by nonprofit groups."' The
Court affirmed the finding that "the city ordinance was unconstitutional
on its face because it permitted the denial or revocation of a permit [for
the sale of merchandise] on the basis of discretionary judgment by the
Chief of Police."79 Significantly, the opinion held that "when nonprofits
engage in activities where pure speech and commercial speech are
inextricably intertwined the entirety must be classified as fully protected
noncommercial speech." '
Judge Brunetti's opinion in Gaudiya Vaishnava Society is one of
several he wrote around this time that illustrate his strengths in analyzing
the development of common law, including federal common law, his
respect for precedents, and his particular interest in issues of Nevada
state law. In McMurray v. United States, the issue was whether the
United States was properly held liable under the Federal Tort Claims
Act for a willful failure to guard or warn against a hazardous conditiona hot spring flowing at a temperature of between 16o and 18o degrees

73. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
74. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 571 (citing Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 194-96).

75. Id. at 573.
76. Id. at 574 (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,445 (1985)).
77. 952 F.2d

1o59

78. Id. at io~o.
79. Id. at I0658o. Id. at xo66.

(9th Cir. 1Q91).
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Fahrenheit.t' Judge Brunetti's opinion concluded that the Nevada
Supreme Court had "modified the definition of willful conduct" applied
in prior federal cases." Thus, over a dissent, the panel upheld the district
court's "holding that the government consciously failed to post a sign at
Lee Hot Springs despite its knowledge of the danger of persons being
burned by this spring."8' The Court held that "[t]his constitutes a willful
failure to warn under [current] Nevada law." 84
In Erickson v. Desert Palace, Inc., Judge Brunetti wrote an opinion
holding that a nineteen-year-old could not pursue a fraud claim arising
from a casino's refusal to pay a slot machine jackpot of over one million
dollars because the winner was below the legal gambling age of twentyone.' After reviewing Nevada case law, the Court concluded that the
attempt to cast the claim as one for fraud did not alter the fact that "the
remedy sought here is recovery of an alleged gaming debt." 86 Thus,
Nevada law barred the claim because it limits "any action to recover such
a debt. . . to the administrative process."8 7 In Morton v. De Oliveira,
Judge Brunetti authored a decision that followed a 1925 Ninth Circuit
opinion, Pacific Steamship Co. v. Sutton," to hold that a ship owner is
strictly liable for the actions of the crew9 Once again Judge Brunetti
carefully analyzed the development of intervening case law, concluding
"Pacific remains the law of this circuit."" Finally, in Ledo FinancialCorp.
v. Summers, Judge Brunetti drafted the Court's opinion holding, over a
dissent by Judge Noonan, "[N]o unique federal interest exists to justify
application of federal common law." which, under prior Supreme Court
doctrine, would have precluded a claim against the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation acting as a receiver for a failed savings and loan
based on an alleged oral loan agreement.9'
In 1999, Judge Brunetti was selected at random to replace Judge
Merhige in a criminal case raising unique Fourth Amendment issues,
United States v. Kyllo ("Kyllo II").92 The case would eventually wind up

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

918 F.2d 834, 835 (9th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 837.
Id. at 838.
Id.
942 F.2d 694, 695 (9th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 696.
Id.
7 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1925).
89. 984 F.2d 289, 292 (9th Cir. 1993).
90. Id. at 292.
91. 122 F.3d 825, 829 (9th Cir. 1997).
92. 190 F.3d 104!, 1043 n.x(9th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 533 U.S. 27

(200!). Judge Robert R. Merhige,
Jr. was a Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia and sat by designation
on the original appeal. See United States v. Kyllo, 14o F.3d 1249, 1250 n.* (9th Cir. 1998), withdrawn,
184 F.3d 1o59 (9th Cir. 1999).
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in the Supreme Court.' In Kyllo II, the issue was whether use of a
thermal imaging scanner by law enforcement officials on the outside of a
home was a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.9 4
The device could detect unusually high levels of heat emanating from a
structure, indicating a likelihood of heat lamps being used to grow
marijuana.95 An officer had reason to believe that the defendant, Kyllo,
was growing marijuana indoors." He used the thermal imaging device,
which indicated a high degree of heat emanating from Kyllo's home.'
The results were used to secure a search warrant for Kyllo's home.' A
subsequent search indeed uncovered an indoor marijuana grow
operation."
The prior panel, comprised of Judges Noonan, Hawkins, and
Merhige, held in a split decision that use of a thermal imaging device was
indeed a "search."" Judge Merhige wrote the majority opinion, joined
by Judge Noonan, while Judge Hawkins drafted the dissent.'o' Had this
opinion stood, the case would have been remanded for a determination
of whether probable cause existed to search Kyllo's home absent
consideration of the thermal imaging scan.'o2 The panel, however,
withdrew the opinion after granting the Government's motion for
rehearing." Judge Merhige then retired and Judge Brunetti was selected
as the replacement judge.'o4 The new panel arrived at an opposite
conclusion, holding that a defendant has no objective expectation of
privacy as to hot spots emanating from the walls or roof of a home.05
This time, Judge Hawkins authored the majority opinion."6 Judge
Brunetti joined Judge Hawkins, while Judge Noonan now found himself
drafting a dissent.'"
Having the last word, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded
Kyllo II in a five-to-four decision in 2001, holding that such conduct
indeed constituted a search.'o More specifically, the Court held that

93. Kyllo v. United States, 530 U.S.

1305 (2000).

94. 190 F.3d at 1043.

95. Id. at lo44.
96. Id. at 1043.
97. Id. at io44.
98. Id.
99. Id.
oo. United States v. Kyllo, 140 F.3d 1249, 1254-55 (9th Cir. 1998), withdrawn, 184 F.3d o59 (9th
Cir. 1999).
1or. Id.at 1250.

Id.at 1255.
103. See United States v. Kyllo, 184 F.3d 1059, 1059 (9th Cir. 1999).
104. Kyllo II, 190 F.3d at 1043 n.I.
102.

i o5. Id. at l1o46-47.-

io6. Id.
at
107.

Id. at

10431043, 1047-

io8. Kyllo v.United States, 533 U.s. 27,

40 (20ol).
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when the government uses a device, not in general public use, to explore
details of a private home that would previously have been unknowable
without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a Fourth Amendment
"search" and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant." Proving
this issue did not squarely fall along any particular political lines, Justice
Scalia wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices Souter, Thomas,
Ginsburg, and Breyer." Justice Stevens dissented, joined by Justices
Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Kennedy."
2.
The Execution of Robert Alton Harris
In 1992 the scheduled execution of Robert Alton Harris resulted in
circumstances that, as described by Judge Noonan, would "generate
hydraulic pressures."" 2 Harris would be the first prisoner in California to
be executed in more than twenty-five years."3 Starting on Friday, April
17, 1992, Harris initiated a flurry of actions seeking a stay of his
execution scheduled for one minute after midnight on April 21, 1992."4
Most notably, a class of prisoners, including Harris, "filed a civil rights
action pursuant to [42 U.S.C. §] 1983 ... [seeking] a permanent
injunction banning the use of lethal gas in the execution of a judgment by
death."" The claim was "that execution by the injection of lethal gas
[was] cruel and unusual punishment."" 6 "On Saturday evening, April 18,
1992, the district court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
[California] 'from inflicting the punishment of death upon Plaintiffs or
any class member by administration of lethal gas.""' The appeal of the
temporary restraining order, as well as the denial of a habeas petition
filed by Harris, were referred to the panel that had decided the last
round of Harris's earlier appeals."8
The Ninth Circuit panel called for oral argument on Sunday night.
As described by Harris's attorneys:
On Easter Sunday evening, April 19, 1992, five lawyers and a panel of

three judges were connected telephonically to argue issues pending in
the case of Robert Alton Harris."' The pressure was intense. Harris

109. Id.

Ilo. Id. at 29.

iii. Id.
112. See Gomez v. U.S. Dist. Court, 966 F.2d 46o, 461 (9th Cir. 1992) (Noonan, J., dissenting).
113. Sevilla & Laurence, supra note 68, at 348.
114. See Gomez v. U.S. Dist. Court, No. 92-70237. 1992 WL 155238, at *i (9th Cir. Apr. 20, 1992);
Sevilla & Laurence, supra note 68, at 370-72.
115. Gomez, 1992 WL 155238, at *i.

I16. Id. at *3.
I17. Id. at *i.
sI8. See id.; Sevilla & Laurence, supra note 68, at 372.
I19. Also present were two law clerks, including one of the Authors of this Article.
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was scheduled to be executed in little more than twenty-four hours, at
12:01 a.m. on April 21st.'2
Over Judge Noonan's vigorous dissent, Judges Alarcon and Brunetti
vacated the temporary restraining order "under the principles of
federalism and comity first announced in Younger v. Harris."2 1
"At approximately 1o:30 p.m. on the night of the scheduled
execution of Harris, ten judges of the Ninth Circuit issued an order
staying the execution and calling for en banc vote on whether to rehear
the [§ 1983] case." 22 One judge of the Ninth Circuit also issued a stay of
execution and called for an en banc vote on the decision to deny his
habeas petition.'23 The Ninth Circuit's stay of execution remained in
place at the time Harris was scheduled to be executed.'" At three o'clock
in the morning, the United States Supreme Court overturned the stay.'2 5
The Supreme Court found that the challenge to the use of lethal gas as
cruel and unusual punishment amounted to an abuse of the habeas writ,
because it "could have been brought more than a decade ago. There is no
good reason for this abusive delay, which has been compounded by lastminute attempts to manipulate the judicial process.,"26 Justices Stevens
and Blackmun dissented, highlighting the pain that was associated with
execution by cyanide gas.' 27
Remarkably, though, Harris's appeals were not yet exhausted.
Judge Pregerson of the Ninth Circuit would issue another stay-at about
four o'clock in the morning when Harris actually was strapped in the
chair awaiting execution.128 In an unusual order, the Supreme Court
vacated the stay and ordered that "[n]o further stays of Robert Alton
Harris' execution will be entered by the federal courts."' 2 9 Harris was
executed at about 6:oo in the morning on April 21, 1992.13o Even years
later, Judge Brunetti would describe to his clerks how "[t]he Harris case
took a lot out of me; there was so much tension it was unbelievable."' 3'
Notably, Judge Brunetti would later join in the Ninth Circuit's
opinion holding that the "execution by lethal gas under the California
protocol is unconstitutionally cruel and unusual" and that a § 1983 action
was a proper vehicle for raising the claim. 2 That he would reach such a
0

120.

Sevilla & Laurence, supra note 68, at 346.

121.

Gomez,

1992 WL

155238, at *3. (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1981)).

122. Sevilla & Laurence, supra note 68, at 376.
123. Id. at 376-77.
124. See id. at 377.
125.

Id.

126. Gomez v. Vasquez, 503 U.S. 653, 653-54 (1992) (per curiam).

127. See id. at 654-58 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
128. Sevilla & Laurence, supra note 68, at 378-79 & n.130.

129. Vasquez v.Harris, 503 U.S. 10oo, 1000 (1992).
130. Sevilla & Laurence, supra note 68, at 379.
131. Chiarello & Poate,supra note 6,at r8.
132. Fierro v. Gomez, 77 F.3d 301, 303, 309 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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conclusion despite the proceedings in Harris is a reflection of his ability
to approach each decision on the merits with as much objectivity as
possible. Judge Brunetti also was active in using the lessons of the Harris
proceedings to create a "more streamlined and efficient process by which
to handle last-minute death penalty appeals.""' Tackling such
monumental death penalty issues is just one part of the solemn
responsibilities of federal judges.
C.

THE SENIOR STATUS YEARS: 1999-2009

Judge Brunetti assumed senior status on November i I, i999.'" He
continued to handle a large caseload and to participate in many
significant appeals. In United States v. Cormier-another Fourth
Amendment expectation of privacy case-Judge Brunetti drafted the
opinion for a unanimous panel, holding that a defendant has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in information contained in a motel's
guest registration records.' In that case, a detective went to a high-crime
area of Seattle and obtained guest registration records from a motel
owner.136 The detective ran a criminal history check on several of the
motel guests, including the defendant Cormier.' The records revealed
that Cormier had "a fairly extensive criminal history" and that he was a
registered sex offender.13' Based on this information, another officer
conducted a "knock and talk" interview with Cormier.139 Cormier gave
consent to the detective to enter and search the motel room. 40 The
detective's search led to the discovery of a loaded handgun in one of
Cormier's jackets hanging in the closet, leading to his conviction for
being a felon in possession of a firearm. 4' Judge Brunetti analogized the
situation to United States v. Miller,' where the Supreme Court held that
a bank depositor does not have a privacy interest in bank records even
though the records may be highly personal. 4 3 He found that the key
factor in Miller was "that a person does not possess a reasonable
expectation of privacy in an item in which he has no possessory or
ownership interest."" Judge Brunetti determined that the bank

133.

Chiarello & Poate, supra note 6, at 18.

134. Media Release, United States Court for the Ninth Circuit, supra note 32.
135. 220 F.3d 1103, ilo8 (9th Cir. 2000). Also sitting on this panel was Judge Brunetti's close
friend, Judge Proctor Hug. See id. at irlo6.
136. Id. at iio6.
137. Id. at ilo6-o7.
138. Id. at 1107 (internal quotation marks omitted).

139. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.

Id.
425

U.S. 435 (1976).

Cormier,220 F.3d at ItIo8 (citing Miller, 425 U.S. at 443).

144. Id.
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depositor analysis was "equally applicable to motel registration
records."' 45 Under the Miller analysis, Judge Brunetti also concluded that
unlike bank records, guest registration records were not highly personal
information and thus, "the Miller rationale [was] even more compelling
in the context of guest registration records because no highly personal
information [was] disclosed to the police."'46
Another memorable criminal appeal that Judge Brunetti
participated in was that of the infamous "Unabomber" -Theodore John
Kaczynski-in United States v. Kaczynski.'47 In one of his several appeals,
Kaczynski, who drafted his own briefs, sought to vacate his guilty plea
and conviction on the grounds that his plea was involuntary." Kaczynski
contended that he was essentially forced to plead guilty in order to avoid
the indignity of his counsel presenting evidence of his mental condition
at trial-a situation that he would find unbearable and which was
purportedly against his wishes.' 49 When Kaczynski tried to fire his
counsel and assert his Sixth Amendment right to represent himself right
before trial, the district court judge denied Kaczynski's request as
untimely and found that the tactic was used to cause delay.'
In a two-to-one decision authored by Judge Rymer and joined by
Judge Brunetti, the court held that the district court had not erred in
concluding that Kaczynski's request for self-representation was made to
cause delay."' In what was primarily a factually intensive analysis, the
panel resisted addressing the legal issue of whether it is the attorney or
the client who controls the decision to present a mental condition
defense to the jury, instead noting that Kaczynski's claim that presenting
such a defense would be unbearable was belied by his willingness to
present mental condition evidence at a possible penalty phase."' Judge
Reinhardt, who wrote the dissent, praised the district judge's effort to
ensure the fairness of Kaczynski's trial but concluded that the denial of
Kaczynski's request for self-representation was contrary to controlling
law.' 3 Notably, had Judge Reinhardt's view prevailed, Kaczynski's
conviction would have been overturned and he would have been allowed
a new trial where he would have risked being convicted after a jury trial
with the possibility of receiving a death sentence. By entering into a plea
agreement, however, Kaczynski had avoided the possibility of a death
sentence altogether.
145. Id.

146. Id.
147. 239 F.3d n'o8 (9th Cir. 2001).

148. Id. atiiio.
149. Id. at 1114, 1117-18
150. Id. at I1112.
151. Id. at IIo, ji6.
152. Id. at II18-19.

'53. Id. at
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In the civil arena, Judge Brunetti wrote the majority opinion in
Knox v. Davis, a 2001 civil procedure case addressing the continuing
violation doctrine in the context of the statute of limitations in a § 1983
action.5 4 Also sitting on the panel were Judges Wallace Tashima and
William Schwarzer,"' who, notably, were the coauthors of a Ninth Circuit
practice guide on civil procedure.', 6 The plaintiff, Monica Knox, was a
federal public defender who, in 1993, began representing William Packer,
an inmate at a California Department of Corrections ("CDC") facility.'57
The relationship evolved into one of romance. In 1995, Knox and Packer
married.'" After marriage, Knox continued to serve as Packer's public
defense attorney. 59
In a § 1983 civil rights action, Knox sued the warden of the prison
for violating her rights when he revoked her visitation and mail
privileges.3 ' The prison determined that Knox had abused her visitation
and mail privileges by, among other things, misusing her attorney-client
relationship with her husband as a cover to make personal visits and/or
send personal mail. 6 ' The long-running dispute over Knox's conduct that
began in late 1994 culminated in a January 20, 1996 letter sent from the
CDC to Knox informing her that her legal mail and visitation rights at all
CDC facilities and with all CDC inmates was revoked. 6 , Over the course
of the next ten months, relying on the January 20, 1996, letter, the CDC
repeatedly denied Knox legal visitation and mail access.' 6' Knox initiated
her § 1983 action on July 21, 1997.164
The narrow question presented was whether Knox had timely filed
her suit within the one year statute of limitations for § 1983 actions in
California.'6 , If the statute of limitations began to run on January 20,
1996, when she received the letter from the CDC revokinj her privileges,
then she would have had to file suit by January 20, 1997.' Knox filed suit
after the January 20, 1997 date, but argued that her action was still timely
under a continuing violation theory.67 In other words, she argued that a
new cause of action arose every time she was denied access to one of her

154. 260F.3d
155. Id.
156. WILLIAM

1oo9, 1Q10
W.

(9th Cir. 2001).
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clients housed at a CDC facility."6 Over Judge Schwarzer's dissent, Judge
Brunetti, joined by Judge Tashima, wrote the majority opinion, holding
that the January 20, 1996, letter was a final determination by the CDC
that started the running of the statute of limitations, and that "the CDC's
subsequent and repeated denials of Knox's privileges with her clients
[were] merely the continuing effect of the original suspension."' As was
Judge Brunetti's nature, he took a practical approach to this issue,
understanding that to hold otherwise would render Congress's intent to
impose a statute of limitations meaningless since Knox could reset the
statute of limitations any time she wanted simply by seeking access to a
CDC facility."'
In a free speech case, Judge Brunetti and his longtime friend Judge
Hug were on opposite sides of a high-profile appeal involving the
Venetian Casino Resort (the "Venetian"). In Venetian Casino Resort v.
Local Joint Executive Board, the question was "whether a sidewalk
constructed on private property to replace a public sidewalk,
accommodating pedestrian traffic adjacent to Las Vegas Boulevard, is a
public forum subject to the protections of the First Amendment." 7 '
During construction, the Venetian entered into an agreement with the
relevant governmental authorities to widen the roadway on Las Vegas
Boulevard.' 2 To do this, however, the government needed to create a
new lane with space that was previously used as a government-owned
public sidewalk.' 73 In return for the wider roadway, the Venetian agreed
to create a pedestrian passageway on what was indisputably its private
property.'74 Soon after a sidewalk on the Venetian property was
constructed, a number of unions applied to Clark County for-and were
granted-permits to demonstrate on the sidewalk in front of the
Venetian."' The Venetian issued warnings to protesters that they were
on private property and requested that the local police remove the
demonstrators as trespassers.' 6 Based on advice from the Clark County
District Attorney's Office, the police refused to take any action against
the demonstrators.' The Venetian sued seeking a declaratory judgment
that the sidewalk is not a public forum, as well as an injunction requiring

168. Id.
169. Id. (emphasis added).
170. See id. at 1014.
171. 257 F-3d 937, 939 (9th Cir. 2001).
172. Id. at 940.

173. Id. at 939-40,942.
174. See
175. Id.

id. at 940.
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the County to enforce the Venetian's rights to exclude demonstrators
from its private property.'
In a two-to-one decision, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court's refusal to grant declaratory relief to the Venetian. 79 Judge Hug,
joined by Judge Schroeder, drafted the majority opinion.'" Judge
Brunetti dissented.'"' The primary disagreement was how to determine
whether the sidewalk, albeit on private property, was a public forum for
First Amendment purposes. Judge Hug focused on the fact that the
original sidewalk which the Venetian sidewalk replaced historically had
been a public forum.' In building the new sidewalk, the Venetian had
not done anything to fundamentally alter the sidewalk's character or its
use by the public.'"' In other words,
The newly constructed sidewalk still performs the same role as a
thoroughfare for pedestrian traffic along Las Vegas Boulevard that it
performed before the construction of the Venetian.... [The purpose
is] "to facilitate pedestrian traffic in daily commercial life along the Las
Vegas Strip generally," and not merely to provide access to the
Venetian for its patrons."'
Thus, the majority found that the new sidewalk was indeed a public
forum and the Venetian could not prevent the unions from lawfully
demonstrating on that space.'
In his dissent, Judge Brunetti disagreed that the new sidewalk is a
public forum merely because it is open to the public generally.'t In his
view, this case was more a matter of contract interpretation than First
Amendment law.'"' The new sidewalk was on land that had always been
privately held, and thus he thought it improper to label it a public forum
simply because it took the place of an adjacent piece of land that had
once been a public forum.'m Instead, he focused on the contract
negotiations between the Venetian and the County that led to widening
the roadway and moving the sidewalk."' As Judge Brunetti put it, "[i]t is
clear that the County could have (and should have) demanded a full
conveyance of the sidewalk.... The County... should not be given by

178. Id. at 941.
179. Id. at 939.
x8o. Id.

181.
182.
183.
184.

Id.
Id. at 948.
Id. at 944-45.
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this court property rights that it clearly bargained away."' " He further
concluded that the Venetian was regulating access to an activity on
private property, which is a private function."' Finally, Judge Brunetti
stated that had the contract between the Venetian and the County
provided the public an explicit right to the property, he would have sided
with the majority in finding that First Amendment rights attached to the
new sidewalk.'9 2
Some might view the Venetian dissent as consistent with the
stereotype of a judge who was appointed by a Republican President.
After all, Judges Hug and Schroeder are generally considered "liberal"
judges, whereas Judge Brunetti was often labeled a conservative judge. 93
Judges Hug and Schroeder emerge as champions of First Amendment
rights whereas Judge Brunetti appears to be denying the union's right to
demonstrate. But a closer look at the decision shows Judge Brunetti's
deference to the other branches of government to create and execute
laws. He was loathe to undercut legislative authority absent a clear
constitutional violation. In other words, he was not an activist judge and
took a very pragmatic approach to each case. In Judge Brunetti's view,
the County essentially failed to legislate the bundle of rights associated
with the sidewalk on the Venetian's property.' 94 Had the County
negotiated for the new sidewalk to remain a public forum, Judge
Brunetti would have shown deference to the County in enforcing the
terms of the contract.' 95 As it stood, however, Judge Brunetti concluded
that the Court ought not to be giving the County rights "that it clearly
bargained away."' 6
In 2003, Judge Brunetti again faced appeals regarding sentencing
issues in United States v. Leon. 9 The case followed a series of decisions
starting with Apprendi v. New Jersey,',8 in which the Supreme Court
established important changes to the federal sentencing landscape and
ultimately concluded, in United States v. Booker, that the United States
Sentencing Guidelines are advisory only and not mandatory.'99 In
addition to the constitutional issues raised by Apprendi and its progeny,
the Ninth Circuit issued numerous decisions during this time frame
affecting the application of the Sentencing Guidelines. One such decision
was Judge Brunetti's opinion in Leon.
190. Id. at 951.
191. Id.at 952.

192. Id.at 953.
193. Id.at 951-

194. See id.
195. Id. at 953-

196. Id.at 951.
197. 341 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2003).
198. 530 U.s. 466 (2000).
199. 543 U.S. 220, 246 (zoo5).
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In Leon, the defendant-appellee, Leon, was convicted of numerous
counts of preparing false tax returns." As a result, Leon's starting
"offense level" under the Sentencing Guidelines was seventeen." Given
Leon's criminal history, an offense level of seventeen meant that the
range for his sentence would be twenty-seven to thirty-three months.?
The district court, however, adjusted Leon's offense level from seventeen
to eleven based on Leon's family ties and responsibilities.' This
downward departure lowered the sentencing range to ten to sixteen
months.20 4 In addition, it placed Leon in a different "zone" under the
Sentencing Guidelines such that the district court could (and did) split
Leon's sentence between imprisonment and home detention.' The
Government appealed the departure.
Judge Brunetti began his analysis by noting that family ties and
responsibilities ordinarily are irrelevant in determining whether a
sentence should be outside the Sentencing Guidelines range, but that
such circumstances could justify a downward departure if sufficiently
extraordinary." In comparing cases that allowed downward departures
based on family circumstances with those that did not, Judge Brunetti
noted that the cases turned on whether the defendant was an
indispensable caretaker for children, the elderly, or ill family members.
Cases allowing a departure did so to protect such family members from
the effects of the defendant's incarceration.'
In applying this standard, Judge Brunetti noted that Leon was the
sole caretaker for his wife, who had recently had a kidney removed due
to renal cancer, and had other medical conditions.2 0 As a result, Mrs.
Leon could not work full time, could not drive, and could not fully care
for herself.2 ' In addition, Mrs. Leon had been suffering from depression
since the time prior to Leon's indictment and was diagnosed as a high
suicide risk if she were to lose Leon to prolonged incarceration." The
evidence concerning Mrs. Leon's emotional state was not contradicted by
the Government.2 3 The evidence also indicated that Leon was the only
person available to provide material, physical, and emotional support to
200. 341
201.
202.
203.

F.3d at 929.

Id.
Id.
Id.

204. Id.
205.

Id.

206.
207.
208.
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210.

Id. at 929, 931.
Id. at 931.
Id. at 931-32.
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Id. at 932.
211. Id. at 930, 932.
212. Id. at 932.
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Mrs. Leon.214 In light of the uncontested evidence indicating that Leon
was an indispensable caretaker for his wife, the court affirmed the district
court's downward departure.2 5 This decision, which predated Booker, in
a sense foreshadowed Booker by recognizing the traditional role of the
district judge to exercise discretion in sentencing, at least where the
record is materially uncontested.
The decisions in two Fourth Amendment criminal appeals arising
out of motions to suppress reflect Judge Brunetti's careful focus on the
underlying facts in deciding cases. In United States v. Wong, the
defendant-appellant, Wong, was convicted of receipt and possession of
child pornography.' Police officers found the evidence supporting the
charges for these crimes when they conducted searches, with warrants, of
Wong's home and computers while investigating the murder of Wong's
live-in girlfriend.' Given that the warrants were unrelated to the child
pornography evidence ultimately found on Wong's computer, the court
addressed the plain view doctrine as applied to evidence contained on a
computer."' In an opinion by Judge Brunetti, the court held that each of
the three elements supporting the application of the plain view doctrine
was satisfied.2 1 9 First, the officer was lawfully in the place where the
evidence was in plain view, because he performed his search pursuant to
a valid warrant issued in connection with the murder investigation.22
That warrant allowed the officer to search graphics files because, as part
of the investigation, the officer was looking for maps and other images
that would have been stored as graphics files.22 ' During the search, the
officer viewed graphics files containing the child pornography.2 Second,
the incriminating nature was immediately apparent. 3 Third, the officer
had a lawful right of access to the individual graphic files pursuant to the
search warrant.22 4 The court affirmed the district court's denial of Wong's
motion to suppress.225
22

22

214. Although Mrs. Leon had other relatives, each was unavailable due to distance or other
reasons. Id. at 93o-31.
215. Id. at 933-34.
216. 334 F.3d 831, 833 (9th Cir. 2003).
217. Id.

218. Id. at 838.
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evidence is in plain view, (2) the incriminating nature of the evidence must be immediately apparent,
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Subsequent to Wong, the court reached the opposite result on the
Fourth Amendment issue in United States v. Deemer, which also involved
evidence found in plain view.2 Here, the court considered the
applicability of the emergency exception to a warrantless search."' The
case began with a call to 911.228 The caller, apparently intoxicated, said
"911" to the dispatcher and then hung up. 9 The dispatcher tried to call
back, but nobody answered.2 30 The dispatcher then sent police officers to
the source of the call.2 3' The 911 system indicated that the call came from
Room 105 at a motel."' That particular motel was well known to the local
police, who had responded to calls from the motel on numerous prior
occasions." Based on those prior calls, the responding officers knew that
the 911 system often displayed Room lo5 as the source of 911 calls from
the motel, even if the calls actually came from a different room.2
The responding officers went to Room lo5, which was quiet and had
no lights on.' Nobody answered when they knocked.236 The officers then
went to an adjacent room, which had the lights on and loud music
playing.237 One officer believed that the rooms might be connected
because Room 105 was small and had no window, and the rooms shared
a common wall.3 When the officers knocked, a woman answered but
opened the door only a few inches.2 39 She stood in the doorway and
obstructed the view into the room.240 The woman then exited the room
and the officers questioned her.24' The woman said that nobody else was
in the room, but the officers then heard movement in the room." The
woman again said that nobody was in the room.2 43 The officers entered
and performed a cursory search.2 " During the search, they found the

226. 354 F.3d II30 (9th Cir. 2oo4).
227. Id. atI131.
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defendant-appellant, Deemer, in the bathroom. 4 5 They also found a
methamphetamine laboratory.246
Deemer moved to suppress the evidence seized on the ground that
the officers' entry into the motel room violated the Fourth
Amendment.247 The district court denied the motion.248 In his opinion
Judge Brunetti set forth the three elements of the emergency exception
to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement." He then concluded
that the third element, that the police have a reasonable basis
"approximating probable cause," was not satisfied. 50 The police had little
reason to believe that the possible emergency that triggered the 911 call
was specifically in Deemer's room.25 ' The motel was large; the officers
knew that the 911 system was often incorrect in identifying Room 105,
and the fact that Deemer's room was adjacent to Room 105 was
insufficient.52 If the rule were otherwise, Judge Brunetti reasoned, then
the police would be able to search multiple houses in a given area based
on a 911 call from only one of the houses.' The court held that the
district court had erred in denying Deemer's motion to suppress. 54 The
decision to uphold the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, despite
the presence of contraband in plain view, reflects Judge Brunetti's
disciplined application of precedent.
Judge Brunetti's opinions, of course, covered a wide range of cases
in the civil arena, including several concerning intellectual property
issues. One such opinion is Earthquake Sound Corp. v. Bumper
Industries.5 Earthquake involved two companies, Earthquake and
Bumper, which competed in selling car audio equipment.256 Earthquake
had a number of "quake" trademarks related to its car audio products,
including "Bass-Quake" and "Earthquake."' Bumper began using the
word "Carquake" with its products.2" Earthquake claimed that
2

2

2

245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.

248. Id.

249. These are: (r) the police must have "reasonable grounds to believe that there was an
emergency" requiring their immediate assistance, (2) the search must not be "primarily motivated by
an intent to arrest and seize evidence," and (3) the police must have "a reasonable basis,
approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area to be searched." Id. (citing
United States v. Cervantes, 219 F.3d 882, 888-91 (9th Cir. 2000)).
250.
251.

Id. at 1132-33.
Id. at 1133.

Id.
253. See id.
252.

254.

Id.

255. 352 F.3d 121o (9th Cir. 2003).
256. Id.at 121 1-12.
257. Id.at 1212.

258. Id.
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"Carquake" infringed Earthquake's trademarks. 59 Earthquake moved for
summary judgment on the issues of liability for infringement and
entitlement to attorney's fees, and the district court granted the motion.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed as to liability for infringement and
remanded for the district court to conduct further proceedings
concerning damages and attorney's fees.t' The district court, having
earlier determined that Bumper's infringement was willful, deliberate,
and knowing, awarded fees to Earthquake, and Bumper again appealed.26 ,
On the second appeal, the Ninth Circuit considered, among other
issues, the sufficiency of the showing that the case was "exceptional,"
such that an award of attorney's fees would be permissible under 15
U.S.C. § III7(a).t63 Writing for the court, Judge Brunetti noted that a
trademark case is considered "exceptional" where "the defendant has
acted maliciously, fraudulently, deliberately, or willfully.,,264 Judge
Brunetti agreed with the district court that Bumper's conduct met this
standard.' 65The "Earthquake" and "Carquake" trademarks were similar;
the parties used the same marketing channels; Bumper used product
identification codes similar to those used by Earthquake; the warranty
information for certain Bumper products concealed Bumper's identity;
there was evidence of actual consumer confusion; Earthquake promptly
informed Bumper of confusion arising from Bumper's use of
"Carquake," but Bumper did not take steps such as consulting counsel to
investigate the possibility of infringement; and Bumper said it would stop
using the "Carquake" mark but continued to use it.t' The Ninth Circuit
affirmed.' 67 This case reflects Judge Brunetti's customary focus on
sensible analysis of the totality of the pertinent evidence and provides a
helpful illustration for the lower courts to use in determining whether
"exceptional" circumstances exist to award fees.
In 2oo8, Judge Brunetti was again in the vortex of a highly charged
criminal law case. In Osborne v. District Attorney's Office, "William
Osborne, an Alaska prisoner, brought [an] action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
to compel the District Attorney's Office in Anchorage to allow him postconviction access to biological evidence. . . used to convict him in 1994 of
kidnapping and sexual assault."26 8 Judge Brunetti authored a unanimous
opinion holding,

259.

Id.

26o. Id.
261. See id.

Id.
263. Id.at1216.
264. Id.
262.

265. Id.at1217-19.
266. Id.at1217-18.

267. Id.at I1220.
268. 521 F.3d III8, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008), rev'd, I29 S. Ct. 2308 (2009).
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[U]nder the unique and specific facts of this case and assuming the
availability of the evidence in question, Osborne has a limited due
process right of access to the evidence for purposes of post-conviction
DNA testing, which might either confirm his guilt or provide strong
evidence upon which he may seek post-conviction relief."'
Judge Brunetti concluded that the State's "paramount interests are
in seeking justice, not obtaining convictions at all costs, and [if
exculpatory evidence is revealed, the State] will then have strong
evidence for use in catching and punishing the real perpetrator. 2 0
Providing access to the evidence could either confirm the validity of the
conviction or lead to Osborne's exoneration.2 ' "Importantly, the State is
prejudiced in neither case, and the truth-seeking function of the criminal
justice system is furthered in either case." 272 Reflecting his general
approach, Judge Brunetti was careful to note, "We are presented with a
certain set of circumstances presenting a meritorious case for disclosure,
and our analysis and holding are addressed to those circumstances

only."273
The Supreme Court reversed in a five-to-four decision.2 74 The Court
held that there is no "right under the Due Process Clause to obtain
postconviction access to the State's evidence for DNA testing,"
reasoning that providing such a right of access is a "task [that] belongs
primarily to the legislature."27 Justice Stevens, joined by Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter dissented.276 Justice Stevens would have
affirmed the Ninth Circuit's decision because he was "convinced that
Osborne [had] a constitutional right of access to the evidence he wishe[d]
to test and that, on the facts of this case, he ... made a sufficient showing
of entitlement to that evidence."27 7 Justice Stevens shared Judge
Brunetti's view that there are "powerful state interests that offset the
State's purported interest in finality per se. When a person is convicted
for a crime he did not commit, the true culprit escapes punishment. DNA
testing may lead to his identification.""'7
CONCLUSION

The range and difficulty of the decisions facing federal circuit judges
are amply illustrated by a review of just a fraction of the Ninth Circuit

269.

Id.

at 1122.

270. Id. at 1141.
271.
272.

Id.
Id.

273. Id. at 1142.

274. Dist. Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009).
275. Id. at 2316.
276. Id. at 2331.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 2337.
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cases in which Judge Brunetti participated. While his decisions often
reflect a conservative approach, on balance Judge Brunetti's record
demonstrates why he built a non-ideological reputation on the court.279
Judge Brunetti stands out for his efforts to approach each case on its own
merits and to resist deciding cases simply along partisan lines. Thus, for
example, he voted to strike down English-only laws in Yniguez v.
Arizonians for Official English," joined in Judge Kozinski's opinion
striking down the United States Sentencing Guidelines as a violation of
the separation of powers doctrine,"' and would recognize a due process
right to post-conviction DNA evidence, as outlined in his opinion in
Osborne.22 Judge Brunetti ultimately would decide that the use of lethal
gas was cruel and unusual punishment2s3 despite the earlier decision in
Harris overturning the district court's temporary restraining order
prohibiting execution by the administration of lethal gas.2?4
At the same time, his decisions in High Tech Gays v. Defense
Industrial Security Clearance Office 85 and Venetian Casino Resort, L.L. C.
v. Local Joint Executive Board" reflect his preference for judicial
restraint. Judge Brunetti's opinions in Adamson v. Rickettsj? the Harris
appeals,288 and Kyllo I1,21' evidence his respect for prosecutorial
discretion and the need for finality in criminal proceedings.
More than anything, though, Judge Brunetti's opinions show that he
truly did strive to "decide[] cases 'on the facts and the record'
and ... draft no-nonsense opinions that parties and future litigants can
understand."" Needless to say, no judge serving on the court of appeals
for twenty-four years can escape making decisions that spark controversy
and disagreement. But especially as the judicial appointment process
seems to grow increasingly partisan, Judge Brunetti's career stands as an
example that our faith in the role of a strong and independent federal
judiciary in our democracy is not misplaced.
As Judge Kozinski wrote in Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, "Judicial
prestige is not an unlimited resource; it is a fragile and finite one, easily
damaged or exhausted. '[P]ublic confidence in the judiciary is
2

279. This reputation has been acknowledged, for example, by Judge Stephen Reinhardt, a noted
liberal Judge of the Ninth Circuit. See Levine, supra note i i.
28o. 69 F-3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 1995).
281. Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, 857 F.2d 1245, 1268 (9th Cir. 1988).
282. 521 F.2d iii8, 1122 (9th Cir. 2oo8).
283. See Fierro v. Gomez, 77 F.3d 301, 302 (9th Cir. 1996).
284. Gomez v. U.S. Dist. Court, No. 92-70237, 1992 WL 155238, at *3 (9th Cir. Apr.
supra notes I12-133 and accompanying text.
285. 895 F.2d 563, 565 (9th Cir. 1990).
286. 257 F.3d 937, 939 (9th Cir. zoo1).
287. 483 U.S. I, 12 (1987).
288. See, e.g.,
Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 15o1 (9th Cir. 1990)
289. 190 F.3d 1041, 1043 (9th Cir. 1999)290. Chiarello & Poate, supra note 6, at 18.

20, 1992);
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indispensable to the operation of the rule of law... .
Judge Brunetti's
life and work inspired those who knew him. His judicial legacy should
bolster public confidence in the federal judiciary and help justify our
belief in the rule of law.

291.

857 F.2d 1245,

1262

(9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902, 923 (D.D.C.

1967) (Wright, J., dissenting)).
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